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Summary 
 
In this thesis I look at modernization theory and the relationship between 
economic development and political liberalization. I focus my analysis on China and I 
investigate a recent argument that seeks to explain why China‟s economic development 
has yet to lead to democratization. This argument asserts that authoritarian regimes are 
able to suppress political opposition while promoting growth by controlling “coordination 
goods.” However when I investigated the control of Chinese Internet, I discovered that 
despite the Chinese Internet system being porous, Internet users maintain a sense of self-
censorship and do not bypass the government established limits. By looking at Internet 
users‟ demographics and their social environment I demonstrate the analysis suffers from 
deterministic rationalization and a tendency to explain rather than understand. Embedded 
in a structural explanation of political change, these types of analyses assume the identity 
and thus the behaviour of people. Even though they claim to explain the weakened link 
between economic and political liberalisation, they bring with them the fundamental 
assumptions of modernization, which amplifies the role of economic development at the 
expense of human action. At the end, their explanation only serves to strengthen the 
modernization theory as it only tries to give excuses to the delayed development of a 
democratic political system as stipulated by the deterministic character of modernization. 
As a result, instead of seeking to understand the underlying forces in play they only 
explain why X has not yet led to Y without contemplating the possibility of X leading Z 
and not Y. By exposing the blind spots of these analyses and exemplify their rigidity, I 
suggest that it is time to break away from conventional wisdom and start looking at other 
possibilities.   
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I. Introduction 
“Of all the alternatives facing China, the emergence of an electoral democracy in 
the next decade is the most likely” (Chen 1998, p.10) and “it is highly unlikely that 
Communist Party dictatorship and increasing socioeconomic pluralism can long co-exist” 
(Brzenziski 1998: p.4) were among the answers given by Chinese specialists on the 
political future of China in a special issue of the Journal of Democracy (1998: 9.1). 
Nevertheless almost a decade later, China still continues to defy what analysts have long 
regarded as an “established finding” (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 903): a linear 
positive relationship between economic development and democratization.  
The relationship between economic development and political liberalisation 
leading to democracy has been the subject of extensive research and debate. Even though 
there is a long history in political thought, going as far back as Aristotle, supporting a 
positive relationship between the two variables, Lipset (1959) presented the first attempt 
to empirically test the relationship, which gave rise to modernization theory and the 
largest research topic in comparative politics. His argument that a linear causal 
relationship has been exists between economic development and democracy has been 
“supported and contested, revised and extended, buried and resuscitated” (Przeworski, 
1997: 156).  
Some scholars go as far as calling this relationship as one of the few, if any, “iron 
laws” in political sociology with economic development consistently emerging as a 
“statistically and substantially significant influence on democracy”. Notwithstanding its 
theoretical grounds and universal applicability have been contested, this hypothesis has 
not only endured but has acquired a notion of conventional wisdom. The fact that most of 
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the rich countries in the world are indeed democratic is presented as iron-clad evidence 
by its supporters (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005).  
Nevertheless most countries suggests that not all countries have followed this 
much tooted causal path, and one of them, China, is the subject of this dissertation. 
Despite the huge steps China has taken in liberalising its economy, it has still to show any 
signs of political liberalisation pointing to democratization. The “reform and openness” 
policy (gaige kaifang) introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 stirred China away from its 
centrally planned economy, an economic policy in accordance to China‟s communist 
political system, and put it on a capitalist path. The success of this policy along with the 
determination of the Chinese leadership to press on with economic liberalisation has been 
evidenced in China‟s recent accession into the World Trade Organisation and its, more 
than two decades, remarkable economic growth. Albeit, the belief held strongly in the 
West that China‟s economic development will result in a democratic political system has 
yet to materialise. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has managed to introduce liberal 
economic policies and maintain rapid economic growth for over twenty-eight years 
without losing its political grip; a development that has led many analysts searching for 
an answer.  
One of the most recent analyses explaining CCP‟s ability to experience economic 
growth while still maintaining its political power has been put forth by Bueno de 
Mesquita and Downs (2005). Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (BDMD) have argued that 
the answer of the puzzle lies in autocratic regimes‟ ability to restrict a certain set of 
public goods, what they call coordination goods, such as political freedom and freedom 
of information that are essential to the political organisation and coordination of political 
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opponents. On the other hand they allow those public goods, such as public education and 
transportation, which help promote economic growth. Thus, contrary to past tendency of 
oppressive regimes to suppress all types of goods and hinder their economies in the 
process, the BDMD argument highlights the increasing sophistication of oppressive 
governments in their ability to stimulate the economy but avoid the political 
consequences of economic growth.  
Intrigued by this explanation I decided to examine the BDMD argument by 
concentrating on one coordination good, its political threat to China and China‟s success 
in maintaining its political authority by controlling this good. I chose to investigate 
China‟s policy on Internet censorship for mainly two reasons: First, the Internet has been 
the latest hope in a long list of factors pundits of democracy have put their hopes on for 
the fall of authoritative regimes and their replacement by democratic governments. 
Second, it presents a fascinating case since under the BDMD argument the Internet is not 
only a coordination good that can give rise to political opposition, but it also represents a 
public good that can foster economic growth. In fact, the Chinese authorities, recognising 
the economic potential of the Internet, decided to adopt it and actively promote is 
diffusion.  
Technological advances have long been vested with the promise of thwarting 
authoritarian regimes. As proclaimed by Ronald Reagan in 1989 “Technology will make 
it increasingly difficult for the state to control the information its people receive.... the 
Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip.” Internet 
has been the latest technological advancement democracy experts have argued will bring 
the end to authoritative governments. In their crusade for world democratisation, they 
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have argued that Internet is the last straw that will lead to dictators‟ demise, because it 
recognizes no boundaries. Its pervasive characteristic undermines dictatorships as it 
facilitates the flow of information, allows for horizontal communication within society 
and undermines the political grip dictators have on the state. It thus provides real 
opportunities for democratization, especially in those societies where governments 
constrain freedom of speech (Abbott, 2001). 
The CCP has embraced the Internet because it recognised its immense 
commercial potential. However, it has also recognised that an unregulated network could 
pose a threat to its political authority by shifting the power from the state to the citizens 
and “has taken care to prevent this commercial gold mine from becoming political 
quicksand” (Hachigian, 2001: 118). Following the BDMD argument, this dual form of 
the Internet as both an economic but also a political coordination good could really test 
China‟s ability to steam economic growth while at the same time prevent political 
coordination. Hitherto, it has been successful. In fact, the initial optimism in literature of 
an Internet-led democratisation has lately been replaced by pessimism as analysts see 
how authoritarian regimes have not only been able to stymie an Internet-led political 
destabilisation, but also use its technology for their benefit.  
China‟s successful policy on galvanising the Internet‟s economic potential while 
controlling its political effects seems to support the BDMD argument. Nevertheless, in 
this treatise I illustrate how this explanation is too simplistic. By examining why the 
Internet has failed to act as a catalyst for democracy, I demonstrate that on the surface we 
can indeed agree with the BDMD argument: the CCP has managed to rip the economic 
benefits of Internet commercialization whilst at the same time curtailing any political 
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coordination and thus successfully managing to maintain its authoritarian power. 
However, that argument serves us an explanation that inhibits our understanding of many 
facets of the Chinese society.  
By unpacking the BDMD argument I demonstrate its blind spots and its failure to 
understand the deeper reasons the Internet-led democratic revolution has not taken place 
in China. As I will exemplify, the reason the Internet has yet to deliver its suggested 
political potential goes deeper than the censorship measures, which even though very 
strict can be bypassed. Indeed as presented here, the ability of Chinese leadership to 
control the Internet is contested. Many scholars point to the many ways people can evade 
Internet censorship and get the information the Chinese authorities don‟t want them to 
see. In fact, CCP‟s success in controlling the Internet lays mainly on self-censorship. In 
other words, even though people might have the opportunity to circumvent Internet 
control, they don‟t take that step. The critical question then is: Why don‟t people seek out 
the information the CCP is trying to keep away from them? Is it because they are afraid 
of taking the risk? But isn‟t taking risks part of the fight of oppressed people demanding 
political freedom?  
In this essay I focus on the social factor and examine why the Chinese society has 
not raised demands for political change. I argue that the analyses that explain China‟s 
ability to reform and liberalise its economy without sacrificing political control by 
pointing to its ability to control and suppress political coordination goods suffer from two 
interrelated blind spots: their deterministic rationalization and tendency to explain rather 
than understand. Embedded in a structural explanation of political change, they assume 
the identity and thus the behaviour of people, which is reduced to material conditions. 
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Even though they claim to explain the weakened link between economic and political 
liberalisation, they bring with them the fundamental assumptions of modernization, 
which amplifies the role of economic development at the expense of human action. In 
fact, their explanation only serves to strengthen the modernization theory as it only tries 
to give excuses to the delayed development of a democratic political system as stipulated 
by the deterministic character of modernization. As a result, instead of seeking to 
understand the underlying forces in play they only explain why X has not yet led to Y 
without contemplating the possibility of X leading Z and not Y. The aim of this thesis is 
not to offer an alternative theory nor make future predictions. Rather it is to expose the 
blind spots of these analyses, exemplify their rigidity and suggest that it is time to break 




In Chapter II of this essay I introduce the reader to modernization theory and the 
research debate that arose out of Lipset‟s article that claimed the first empirical proof of a 
causal relationship between economic development and democratization. The literature 
surrounding modernization theory is based mainly on positivist analyses and thus many 
of the works presented here focus on methodological issues. Even though the literature is 
rather tedious, this chapter serves several purposes. It presents the origins and 
development of modernization theory throughout the last five decades and illustrates the 
determination of many scholars to prove the positive relationship between economic 
growth and political liberalisation. Furthermore, it demonstrates that even though 
modernization theory has acquired the notion of conventional wisdom, other theories 
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have challenged and criticised its ahistorical and structural foundations. In this chapter I 
also introduce the literature which examines the relationship of mass communication and 
democracy and the latest Internet-led democracy arguments.    
In Chapter III, I start to explore the case of China by first giving a brief historical 
background of its economical and ideological changes since the late 1970s. I then take a 
close look at the situation of Internet censorship in China, before I move on to Chapter IV 
where I start investigating why the Internet has not fulfilled its role as a catalyst for 
democratisation. I first try to reach an explanation by using the BDMD argument but 
when that does not provide an adequate explanation I start to unpack it by asking a series 
of questions. The rest of the essay represents the research process I went through in 
unravelling the blind spots of the BDMD argument. In the concluding remarks I bring all 
the points together and demonstrate why the BDMD argument and the modernization 
theory is imbedded in fail to give an adequate explanation to China‟s lack of 
democratisation so far.  
 
Remarks 
 I would like to note that in this essay I use the terms Chinese authorities, 
government, state and Communist Party (CCP) interchangeably. As it is common with 
communist political systems, the CCP represents the only political party and controls all 
the government and state affairs and as such it is the ultimate political authority in China.  
II. Economic Development and Democracy: Modernization Theory 
The main assumption of modernization theory is the existence of one general 
process of development with a causal chain that leads to only one final stage: 
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democratisation. A sequence of industrialisation, urbanisation, education, 
communication, mobilisation and political incorporation leads to social changes that 
terminate in democratisation (Przeworski, 1997). The modernity process is associated 
with the process of change of Britain, the US and Western Europe during the nineteenth 
century and assumes that modern society is a product of capitalism (Grugel, 2002). The 
argument follows that economic growth becomes a democratic change as it produces an 
educated and entrepreneurial middle class which sooner or later demands the political 
benefits of democracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005; Burkhard and Lewis-Beck, 
1994).  
Lipset agreed with Weber‟s suggestion that “modern democracy in its clearest 
forms can only occur under the unique conditions of capitalist industrialization” (Weber 
quoted in Lipset, 1959: 73). For Lipset, capitalism is a causal factor for democracy 
because it produces wealth and leads to mass consumption, an educated middle class and 
numerous cultural changes which are favourable to democracy (Grugel, 2002). He argued 
that diminished class conflict is an important link between economic growth and 
democracy. More specifically, as the lower strata moves up by gaining increased 
economic security and higher education it develops a more gradualist view of politics and 
reduces its commitment to given ideologies; especially extremist ones.  
“Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy by 
changing the social conditions of the works, but it also affects the political role of 
the middle class through changing the shape of the stratification structure so that it 
shifts from an elongated pyramid with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a 
growing middle class. A large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating 
conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize 
extremist groups” (Lipset 1959: 78).  
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Lipset referred to Aristotle to illustrate the long tradition of arguments 
exemplifying the relationship between democracy and economic development, which as 
he argues is perhaps the most prevalent generalization that connects political systems 
with other aspects of society. “From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that 
only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a 
situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in 
politics” (Lipset, 1959: 75).  Notwithstanding the long history of this political thought, 
Lipset was the first to put the relationship to an empirical test in his seminal essay “Some 
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” The 
lively debate that sprang from his work is centred on methodological variations, and 
although many of the scholars agree on the positive relationship between economic and 
democratic development, they disagree on the form of the relationship and the definition 
of democracy. Nonetheless, there are scholars who challenge this well established notion 
of history repeating itself through the modernization theory.  
 
Lipset (1959): “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and  
Political Legitimacy”  
 
Lipset set out to test his hypothesis of socioeconomic development and political 
democracy by comparing the mean values of several economic development indicators 
among democratic and undemocratic countries. For Lipset democracy “is defined as a 
political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the 
governing officials” (Lipset, 1959: 71). He explicitly stated his study was not examining 
the political histories of individual countries, as the social content of democracy in the 
different countries was not regarded as the real problem of his essay. 
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Lipset alluded to a Middle East study to suggest his argument had a cross-cultural 
validity. The study performed by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social 
Research on the Middle East (reported in Lerner, 1958), surveyed six Middle Eastern 
countries and showed high associations between urbanization, literacy, voting rates, 
media consumption and education. Lerner‟s view of modernization as a sequential 
process of historical phases leading to democracy was regarded as an important 
theoretical contribution by Lipset. Nevertheless, Lipset argued that Lerner did not have 
the adequate data to support his thesis and hence offered the material in his own essay as 
an opportunity for empirical research along the same lines.  
Lipset used a number of indicators for wealth, industrialization, education and 
urbanization, which he called the economic development complex, and investigated their 
consequences for democracy by presenting their statistical means for four groups of 
countries: European and English-speaking stable democracies, European and English-
speaking unstable democracies and dictatorships, Latin American democracies and 
unstable dictatorships and Latin American stable dictatorships. For example, for the 
wealth indicator he used per capita income, number of persons per vehicle and per 
physician and the number of radios, telephones and newspapers per one thousand people. 
His findings indicated 17 persons for each vehicle in the European and English-speaking 
democratic countries in comparison to 143 in less democratic countries in the same area. 
In Latin America the numbers were 99 and 274 respectively. Similar comparisons in 
favour of the democratic countries were found for all the indicators of wealth, 
industrialization, education and urbanization between democratic and non-democratic 
nations, which led him to his conclusion: 
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“the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of 
education is much higher for the more democratic countries” (Lipset, 1959: 75).  
 
Although he did not express it clearly, it seems from his discussion that the relationship 
he was postulating between levels of economic and democratic development was a 
positive linear relationship. Furthermore, even though hr presented the various indices 
separately he argued that they all formed one common factor:  
“…it seems clear that the factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth and 
education are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor. And the factors 
subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of 
democracy” (Lipset, 1959: 80).  
 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Lipset‟s analysis: a) his theory on a 
linear relationship between capitalism and democracy is essentially functionalist, 
economistic and predictive (Grugel, 2002), and b) democracy is an outcome of economic 
growth and for those societies that become part of the global economic structure and 
“replicate the original transition” to capitalism (Roxborough, 1979 as quoted in Grugel, 
2002: 47) democracy is the final outcome.  
 
The Ensuing Debate  
Although Cutright (1963) provided empirical support for Lipset‟s argument, he was 
highly critical of Lipset‟s methodology. According to Cutright, Lipset simply 
demonstrated that there were some major socioeconomic differences between democratic 
and non-democratic nations but without telling us the strength of association between the 
variables. Cutright pointed to a particularly puzzling factor in Lipset‟s methodology: it 
was impossible to categorise a nation as democratic or not based on its score, because of 
the extreme spread in the ranges of scores in each indicator. For example, the range for 
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telephones in European and English-speaking democracies was from 43 to 400 per 1,000 
people while for dictatorships it was from 7 to 196. From this we can easily see 
Cutright‟s argument: a nation with 43 to 196 telephones per 1,000 people can be in either 
category.  
Cutright attempted to refine Lipset‟s methodology and broaden the theoretical 
scope of the findings by using a more sophisticated measure for democratic development 
and a more detailed statistical analysis of continuous data (Jackman, 1973). By defining a 
politically developed country as one with “more complex and specialized national 
political institutions than a less political developed nation” (Cutright, 1963: 255), he 
developed an index where each nation was placed on a continuum based on its political 
development. Subsequently, this index was correlated with a number of indicators of 
socioeconomic development arriving at a high degree of association between political 
development and the independent variables, which supported Lipset‟s thesis of a linear 
positive relationship between economic and political development.  
Cutright‟s analysis ignited even more controversy on methodological issues. 
Neubauer (1967) criticised Cutright‟s political development index, which he asserted 
equated democratic development with political complexity and stability and the 
insensitivity of the independent variables between countries, especially at higher levels of 
democratic development (Jackman, 1973). Using a more sophisticated measure of 
democratic development and focusing on more democratic countries he concluded that 
democratic development was a threshold phenomenon.  
“Certain levels of „basic‟ socio-economic development appear to be necessary to 
elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-wide 
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patterns of political interaction, one of which maybe democracy. Once above this 
threshold, however, the degree to which a country will „maximize‟ certain forms of 
democratic practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development” 
(Neubauer, 1967: 1007).  
Neubauer also suggested the world is not as deterministic as the modernization 
theory wants it to be and hence it is wise to take into consideration the factor of choice. In 
fact he argued that “countries and their leaders are free to choose from a variety of 
alternatives concerning their form of political organization” (Neubauer, 1967: 1008) and 
he offered the case of Communist countries as an example: they have obtained the socio-
economic development Lipset and Cutright refers to but have chosen a different type of 
institutional structure than liberal democracy. Neubauer‟s remark that “the nature and 
extent of democratic practices in many countries appear to be less a function of their state 
of social and economic development than of certain values embedded in their political 
culture” (Neubauer, 1967: 1008) and his urge to scholars to “go beyond consideration of 
those (socio-economic) factors which are at best threshold conditions” (Neubauer, 1967: 
1009) represent a refreshing note in the monotonous literature of modernization theory.  
Smith (1969) recognised the technical advantage of Cutright‟s study, but he was 
dissatisfied with its ability to empirically measure degrees of democracy. By adding a 
new technique, Smith replicated Cutright‟s research design and applied it to a larger 
number of audiences. His objective was not to present a new theory but rather an 
empirical analysis of previously developed theories. He alluded to the limitations of 
conceptual models and statistical techniques and the generalizations made from methods 
using standardised measures of association. He argued that “such generalizations can 
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have validity only for the specific populations and sample times of the data base” (Smith, 
1969: 123), and he instead suggested the usage of standardised measures for the 
deduction of causal laws of social and political interaction.  
Jackman (1973) recognised the advantage of Neubauer‟s refined measure of 
democratic development, but he pointed out to Neubauer‟s data limitation as a result of 
his focus on wealthier countries. By using a similar measure of democracy and energy 
consumption as a measure of economic development he tested the linear and threshold 
hypotheses. Even though data from his analysis were much more consistent with 
Neubauer‟s argument for a threshold effect than those of a linear relationship suggested 
by Lipset and Cutright, he cautioned that the difference between the two was so marginal 
that “it is difficult to justify empirically the interpretation that democratic performance 
declines at the highest levels of economic growth” (Jackman, 1973: 621).  
Two studies that came out in 1998 presented a major attack on modernization 
theory. Gonick and Rosh argued that “economic development…is not the most important 
factor affecting the degree to which a political system can be characterized as a „liberal 
democracy‟…our application has allowed us to reject the findings of Lipset” (Gonick and 
Rosh, 1988 quoted in Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 903). Arat (1988) was also highly 
critical of the modernization theory. His longitudinal analysis showed widely varied 
relationships between levels of socioeconomic development and democracy, which led 
him to conclude: “only a few countries fit the models suggested by modernization 
theory… it can be concluded that increasing levels of economic development do not 
necessarily lead to higher levels of democracy, even for less developed countries” (Arat, 
1988: 30).  
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Arat argued that democracy was not a one way ladder countries climb as their 
socio-economic conditions develop.  He pointed out that developing countries displayed 
much more complex patterns than a linear relationship and countries in the middle of the 
development continuum experienced higher levels of instability on the democracy scale. 
Most importantly, Arat drew attention to scholars‟ neglect to take into consideration an 
important observation in Lipset‟s study: his argument that economic development is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for democratic development. By neglecting this 
important point, analysts have not paid adequate attention on finding the other conditions 
of democracy.  
 As a response to the studies challenging modernization theory, Burkhart and 
Lewis-Beck offered “hard evidence” in order to re-establish what they considered to be 
an “established finding” (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994: 903). Nevertheless, they 
recognized that previous studies proving the relationship had several methodological and 
data limitations. By using a democracy index based on political rights and civil liberties 
they assembled country annual observations for seventeen years and thus incorporated an 
over-time as well as cross-nation analysis of democratic variation. They concluded that 
“economic development substantially improves a nation‟s democratic prospects…the full 
magnitude of that effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system…even 
at the periphery, however, the effect remains statistically and substantively significant” 
(Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1944: 907).   
A more recent argument has been presented by Lefwich who suggested that in the 
long term economic development would inevitably lead to democracy and urged the West 
to support only those “…dedicated and determined developmental elites which are 
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seriously bent on promoting economic growth whether democratic or not. For by helping 
them to raise the level of economic development it will help them also to establish or 
consolidate the real internal conditions for lasting democracy” (Leftwich, 1996: 329). 
Diamond‟s (1996) work has been an effort to update the modernization theory by 
emphasising the role of political culture, civil society and civil freedoms in the 
development of democracy. However, he has been criticised that his “new version of 
modernization theory is just as profoundly embedded in Western policy-making circles… 
not surprisingly, the, modernization remains the vision behind a number of democracy-
promoting initiatives…retains vitality and influence through its ability to identify the 
apparent link between capitalism and democracy” (Grugel, 2002: 51).   
 Even though it is not possible to present more than just the main works that arose 
in response to Lipset‟s analysis, it is clear that the debate is centred on methodological 
issues and statistical analysis. The work surrounding modernization theory very cut and 
dry. Essay after essay takes the reader through tedious series of data in an effort to prove 
a positive causal relationship between socio-economic development and democracy. 





Beyond Modernization Theory 
 
Modernization theory rose out of the attempt to “theorize the fact that 
democracies have emerged in the modern world under capitalism” (Grugel, 2002: 48). 
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The result was the development of a dominant cannon claiming democracy would 
“naturally emerge after a society had undergone necessary economic and social 
transformations” (Przeworski et al, 2000: 3). Modernization theory paraded democracy as 
an unavoidable result of development and thus warned that dictatorships generating 
development would cause their own self-destruction.  
 Nonetheless, an important number of scholars did not agree with the ahistorical 
and structural explanation of modernization theory. Lipset‟s followers assume history 
repeats itself, but this notion has been contested by scholars such as Moore and 
O‟Donnell. These analysts used comparative historical studies, focused on the intensive 
analysis of a few cases (Huber et al, 1993), had an interest in explaining rather than 
predicting and looked for factors that were distinctive to specific cases (Grugel, 2002). 
Moore‟s The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy is a renowned example of 
studies focusing on historical sociology. Moore argued that the Western European path to 
democracy was a unique process: “the route that ended up in capitalist democracy…was 
itself a part of history that almost certainly will not be repeated” (1966: 5). His 
comparative study on eight countries and their path to modernity during the twentieth 
century stressed the importance of the role played by middle class and urban bourgeoisie 
in the transformation of political systems into democracies (Arat, 1988).  
 Moore‟s work also pointed to the timing of development as being an important 
factor on a country‟s political development. He compared the imperative role played by 
an independent entrepreneurial class in the European industrialization process with the 
state initiated economic developments in developing countries; he called the latter 
“revolution of above” (Collier, 1975). Moore agreed with Marx‟s thesis that an 
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indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy is an independent class 
of town dwellers: “No bourgeois, no democracy” (Moore, 1966: 418). On the other hand, 
when the state plays a large role in the industrialization process democratic development 
tends to be inhibited. This was echoed in a study by Bollen who argued “the greater the 
state‟s control of the economy, the lower the level of democracy” (Bollen, 1979: 572). 
Bollen also drew attention to culture and agreed with Weber () on the importance the 
protestant-based culture played in the development of western democracies.   
 O‟Donnell (1973) challenged Lipset‟s thesis on both empirical and theoretical 
grounds by focusing on the role of actors and their strategies instead on the deterministic 
conditions of modernization theory. He called for the end of the debate by stating that it 
was no longer necessary to present tedious series of data to “demonstrate that socio-
economic development does not foster democracy and/or political stability” (O‟ Donnell, 
1973: 170). He is among those scholars who accuse modernization theory of 
exaggerating the role of the capitalistic structure at the expense of human action since the 
behaviour of people is assumed and treated as an epiphenomenon that is reduced to 
material conditions (Schmitz and Sell as summarised by Grugel, 2002).  
In response to the modernization theory, the transition, or agency approach, puts 
the actors back into the centre of attention pointing to their conscious and committed 
actions along with a degree of luck and willingness to compromise as the main means of 
transition to democracy. As one the influential supporters of this thesis, Przeworski, says:  
“The emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic development. 
Democracy is or is not established by political actors pursuing their goals, and it 
can be initiated at any level of development” (Przeworski, 1997: 177).   
 
Przeworski alludes to relationship between development levels and democracy but he 
adds:  
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“What remains controversial, however, is the relative importance of the level of 
development as compared to other factors, such as the political legacy of a 
country, its past history, its social structure, its cultural traditions, the specific 
institutional framework, and, last but not least, the international political climate” 
(Przeworski et al, 2000: 21).  
 
Although there has been quite a substantive literature challenging modernization 
and presenting alternative theories, it still maintains its notion of conventional wisdom 
notion. The promise of Internet-led democratization builds on the premises on 
modernization theory.  
 
The Communication Factor and Internet-led democratisation 
“There is a peculiarly intimate relationship between the political process and the 
communications process” (Pye, 1963: 6).  
 
Implicit in the relationship between communications and politics is the notion that 
information is power: based on the information distributed by communication media, 
society forms a public opinion which influences the course of government (Schramm, 
1971).  A lot of the studies on modernization theory include communications as an 
important factor in the socio-economic development that leads to democratisation. In 
fact, Cutright found that the communication index was the variable most closely 
associated with democratic development: “The most striking thing…is the steady 
increase in the level of political development as the level of communication development 
increases” (Cutright, 1963: 257). 
Lerner, in his study of Middle Eastern countries, suggested that media growth was 
a vital factor for democratic development. Other scholars, such as Deutch (1964) and Pye 
(1966) pointed to the importance of an integrative system of mass communications for 
the production of the social cohesion that is necessary for the reinforcement of a 
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democratic institutional framework. As Pye puts it: “to a remarkable degree the 
difference between private and public affairs is determined by the extend to which acts of 
individuals are either amplified or ignored by the communication process. Without a 
network capable of enlarging and magnifying the words and choices of individuals there 
could be no politics capable of spanning a nation… the communication process informs 
the members of a community about the extend to which they can and should legitimately 
question the motives the intentions of those initiating political actions” (Pye 1966: 154). 
However, Schramm warns us that “efficient communication works as well for a 
dictator as for a democrat – probably better, in fact, for the dictator because he is more 
likely to seize a monopoly over communication” (Schramm, 1963: 55). Authoritarian 
rulers try to shape the minds of those they govern by controlling the communication 
media (Schramm, 1971) and instigating a propaganda campaign.  In similar fashion, 
Lynch uses the term “thought work” to refer to the “struggle to control communications 
flows and thus the “structuration” of the symbolic environment from which people derive 
their worldviews, values and action strategies…If a state can control society‟s 
communications process, it can structure the symbolic environment in such a way that 
citizens will be more likely to accept that state‟s political order as legitimate” (Lynch 
2003: 2).  
 When the Internet started spreading around the world it was immediately vested 
with the role of a “Trojan horse” being used by “activists and campaigners in 
authoritarian regimes to effect political change and reform” (Abbott, 2001: 100). Many 
scholars argued that totalitarian regimes were being threatened by this new information 
technology, because they were unable to control and manipulate it as they did with 
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conventional media (Perrit, 1998). This argument was based on the technological design 
of the Internet, which analysts thought could not be subjected to a centralised control. 
The Web spanned the world, connected people by defying geographical boundaries and 
political orders and hence had a “great subversive potential,” (Taubman, 1998: 259). 
As such, this new communication medium could escape the control of 
authoritarian governments and erode their grip on freedom of information and thought 
control.  As an open medium, which facilitates the free and instantaneous exchange of 
news and opinions while providing anonymity to its users, the Internet was particularly 
useful in the fight against authoritarian rule. Unable to keep their people from gaining 
access to unfiltered information, authoritarian governments would lose the battle of 
information control and people‟s exposure to forbidden information would galvanise 
grass-roots opposition and challenge the political establishment (Kalathil, 2001). At last, 
the democracy advocates had a weapon they could use against authoritarian regimes 
around the world. 
Nevertheless, Internet activists soon discovered that this was a two-sided war. The 
authoritarian regimes, which the Net was supposed to topple, got their hands on the 
Internet and not only were they able to censor it like other communication media, but also 
use it for their own benefit. Oppressive governments are today using sophisticated 
censorship instruments to stay one step ahead of online dissidents. Despite Internet‟s 
bounder-less heralded characteristic, it turns out there is a way to block the free flow of 
information on the Internet superhighway that spans the world. The Internet-led 
democratization movement was hit with a blow.  
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III. China: The defiant case 
An Economic Phenomenon  
China‟s economic growth for the last three decades has been outstanding: a 
tenfold increase in GDP, a massive reduction of poverty, and a new acquired status of a 
global economic force. The most populated country in the world has managed to radically 
shift its economic model form command-control to market-driven and transform its low-
quality production exports to sophisticated high-technology goods (Hale et al, 2003). The 
country‟s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001 not only 
signalled its acceptance into the world economy, but also China‟s emerging role as a 
global economic power. All these notable economic results have been the result of the 
“reformed and openness” policy (gaige kaifang) introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. 
The centrally-planned economy was supplemented by a combination of market 
mechanisms while and at the same time the Chinese economy was opened up to the 
outside world in order to encourage expanded trade and lure in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Joseph, 2001). In fact, China has become United States‟ biggest competitor in 
attracting FDI.  
The economic reform brought along a change in ideology. Instead of fostering 
continual class struggle, which was the case during the Maoist era, the CCP was now 
promoting economic modernization (Harding, 1998). Under the rubric of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” Deng managed to bypass the ideological barriers of his 
commercialisation plan by arguing that the market is merely an economic development 
mechanism and does not determine if a system is capitalist or socialist (Zhao, 1998). 
Moreover in order to promote his plan, he gave “Xiaokang,” a term from a classical 
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poetry book that represents ideal society as one that provides well for all its citizens, an 
economic dimension (Hale et al, 2003). Despite the rhetoric for a socialist market 
economy, he openly endorsed a liberalised market economy.  
Even though Deng was the major actor in the decision to open up China‟s 
economy to the world, the country‟s recent accession to the WTO signals the leadership‟s 
determination for increased openness. Similarly to Deng, the current leadership has the 
ability to introduce economic reforms because it enjoys political dominance over the 
government. In fact, China today is one of the few remaining communist states and as 
with all communist political systems, the CCP has ultimate authority in the governance of 
the country. Moreover, it is not formally accountable to its citizens since its officials do 
not have to stand for elections (Shirk, 1994).  
A lot of scholars have doubted China‟s ability to maintain its economic growth 
without an analogous political reform: “Further efforts to resist political change will only 
squander the benefits of social and economic dynamism” (Gilboy et al, 2001). 
Nevertheless, China continues to enjoy an annual average GDP growth of 10% and has 
the second-largest economy in the world after the US. Even more surprisingly, it now 
exports more information technology that the US whilst its trade surplus with the United 
States has been grown exponentially. Furthermore, and crucial for the purpose of this 
study, China has defied modernization theory: it has experienced one of the fastest 
economic developments in the world for almost three decades, but has not even come 
close to political liberalisation.  
 
The Internet Factor 
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Economic Allure and Political Threat 
When China was faced with the choice of boarding the Internet superhighway or 
closing its doors to the commercial phenomenon of the late twentieth century, it jumped 
on the opportunity to seize the Internet‟s lucrative prospective. Realising the immense 
economic potential of e-commerce, the CCP embraced the World Wide Web as another 
opportunity to galvanise the country‟s economy. Based on the new party ideology of 
economic modernization, the leadership could not turn away from the information 
revolution despite its reputation as a revolutionary medium. Judging from developments 
so far, it seems like it was the right decision.   
The Chinese economy has been largely fuelled by massive amounts of FDI 
pouring into state-owned and private firms all over the country. For more than a decade 
China has been the second largest recipient of FDI in the world and has attracted more 
FDI than any other developing country since 1993 (Gallagher, 2002). China‟s leaders 
realised early on the potential of the Internet to draw even more foreign capital and bring 
along technological advances. Hachigan (2001) offers a very good summary of the allure 
the Internet presented to the CCP: by looking at the impact on the American, European 
and other Asia economies the CCP leaders realised the Internet‟s promise as the best 
economic model for the future and as more and more international companies were 
adopting an online supply platform, China would risk being left out of the global 
competitive market if it not introduced analogous web-based systems.  
Even though the first electronic mail from China was sent as early as 1987, the 
Internet was not given much attention until the mid-1990s when China started catching 
up with the high-tech domain (Zhao 1998, Qiu 2003). Although the Internet in China 
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took off later than in most developed countries, it has been developing in leaps and 
bounds growing from less than 40,000 Internet users in 1995 to 153 million in June 
2006
1
. While analysts argue that official Chinese statistics are usually exaggerated, there 
is no question Internet in China has been growing in tremendous pace. Despite 
assessments from analysts such as Milner (2003) arguing that authoritarian regimes are 
less inclined to foster Internet development than democratic ones, the Chinese 
government has been promoting its development. Convinced on the Internet‟s 
indispensable role for the country‟s economic modernization, government authorities 
have been actively encouraging its diffusion. The “Government On-line” and “Enterprise 
One-line” were initiatives adopted to ensure most of government as well as state-owned 
and private businesses had a web presence. Furthermore, the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII), China‟s network regulator, keeps pushing the major telecom provider for 
lower access charges while new fibre-optic lines are constantly added. H-tech firms are 
offered tax-breaks and Internet start-ups enjoy low-cost homes at government-funded 
technology parks (Hachigian, 2001: 119-121).  
Along with welcoming its economic benefits, however, the CCP had to fight the 
wide-spread political threats attached to this new medium. As mentioned in the 
introduction, many analysts argue that the very nature of Internet dooms authoritarian 
regimes. Scholars, such as Kedzie (1997), have argued that the Internet posses a 
“dictator‟s dilemma” for authoritarian governments that have to chose between 
connecting to the Internet and as a consequence democratise or keep the information 
revolution out of their country. As summarised by McCormick and Liu the arguments 
along this line stipulate that the Chinese government “can either tolerate the Internet, in 
                                               
1 As reported by latest statistics on China Internet Network Information Centre http://www.cnnic.net.cn.  
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which case it will be undermined by the free flow of information, or it can ban or restrict 
its development, in which case the People‟s Republic will remain technologically 
backward and become economically stagnant” (McCormick and Liu, 2003: 142). 
However, China has been successful in neutralising the Net as a political opposition 
medium while capitalising on its economic benefits: “…despite the technology‟s 
liberalizing potential, its high speed of growth can be maintained within the framework of 
the current political system dominated by CCP… yet it develops so rapidly, regardless of 
the political factors many believe would handicap the nation‟s Internet industry from its 
inception” (Qiu, 2003: 10).  
As Kathil (2001) points out, embracing the Internet revolution has not only helped 
China modernise its economy and compete in the global economic sphere but has also 
proven useful in helping the CCP to govern more effectively. By developing an ambitious 
e-government plan, ministries have eliminated layers of middlemen and the corruption 
which usually plagues them. The ability to streamline the government via web methods 
has also helped the government augment its central authority and better control the 
provinces. Furthermore, the officials have been using the Internet revolution to enrich the 
state and themselves. Even though regulators are supposed to be separated from those 
they regulate, many government entities invest in the information technology sector and 
private companies “seek government partnerships because they provide political cover 
and make it easier to pry capital from state-owned banks (Hachigian, 2001: 121). 
As far as the CCP leadership is concerned, it seems to have taken the right 
decision: Internet is flourishing, the information technology sector has been growing with 
an impressive rate, and money is pouring into the state‟s vault. Internet revolution in 
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China has brought economic benefits but no destabilising political demands. Boas (2005) 
regards China as one of the most prominent examples of an authoritarian government‟s 
ability to promote Internet development while simultaneously establishing an effective 
control over it by technological and institutional means. The next section looks closer at 
the steps taken by the CCP to neutralise the political threats of Internet usage.  
 
Neutralising the Web threat 
The stark contrast between the laissez-faire vision of the Internet promoted by 
advanced democracies and the more conservative hands-on approach of authoritarian 
regimes was made very clear at the December 2003 World Summit on the Information 
Society in Geneva. Saudi Arabia argued that the moral, religious and social values of all 
societies should be taken into consideration in the development of the information society 
while China strongly opposed a statement of support for the principles of free speech 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Boas, 2005). Although China‟s 
objections were disregarded, this did not deterred it from continuing with its elaborate 
system of domestic Internet control.  
In China the Internet falls within the media control system, which is guarded by 
Leninist ideology and the belief that “the media must serve both for the politics and for 
the party” (Wu, 2005: 216); a Marxist element which has served as a central part to 
CCP‟s media governing and control (Zhao, 1998; Qui, 2003; Wu, 2005). The almost 
unlimited legal discretion vested upon the Chinese government allows it to take any 
measures it deems necessary to retain Internet control while promoting its market-based 
diffusion. Although it is difficult to know the exact extend of its censorship regime, as 
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China does not openly share such information, the evidence shows that an overlapping 
multilayer of control has been employed to control the majority of user access (Boas, 
2005).  
Four mechanisms have been the main pillars of Internet control in China: 
architecture, law, self-censorship and market controls (Boas, 2005). While architecture 
depends on technological characteristics, the successful implementation of the other three 
mechanisms depends on human behaviour. Boas reminds us of the initial controversy 
surrounding the early scholarship of Internet control. Sceptics then pointed to the 
inability of governments to regulate the Internet as its technological designed resisted 
centralised control. However, what the sceptics failed to take into consideration was the 
capacity of the Internet to evolve and adapt, and hence the opportunity for authoritarian 
regimes to adopt its technology to fit their purposes.  
One of the most common technological methods employed for Internet control is 
the blocking of specific websites. This took effect in China in September 1998 when 
government authorities blocked as much as one hundred websites, such as the Wall Street 
Journal, Washington Post and CNN (Zhao, 1998). China has the ability to do this because 
it controls the physical Internet infrastructure, namely the cables that connect the 
domestic Chinese network to the outside world. Hemming (2002) calls this the virtual 
“Red Firewall” that China has constructed in order to keep subversive material outside its 
gates. The one hundred web pages block of 1998 have grown to more than 500,000 and 
includes the sites of human rights groups, spiritual movements and foreign news 
organisations such as the BBC (Hemming, 2002). This has been possible through the 
introduction of a more sophisticated system in September 2002, which blocks pages 
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based on keywords they contain, such as “democracy,” “human rights” and “freedom” 
(Boas, 2005).  
Both the Internet and Intranet are completely controlled by the Chinese state and 
government approval is needed before anyone is allowed to set-up or use a network 
(Abbott, 2001). While the government has been promoting the development of Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) that provide end-users with Internet access, it can still maintain 
control of Internet use by channelling connectivity through a small number of 
interconnected networks that are tied to either the government or state-owned companies. 
Even though the number of interconnecting networks has grown, the Ministry of 
Information Industries has licensed only those that can be under effective state control 
(Boas, 2001; Clark and Harwit, 2001). Through this network set-up, the authorities can 
implement policies such as the Computer Information Network and Internet Security 
Protection and Management Regulations passed in December 1997, which requires ISPs 
to provide the China Internet Network Information Centre with users‟ personal 
information.  
Hemming (2002) reports that at least 60 laws covering Internet control have been 
passed since Chinese authorities started allowing commercial Internet accounts in 1995. 
Among others, individuals have to register with their neighbourhood police bureau within 
thirty days of opening an online account. Internet users have to follow “…onerous 
registration procedures, including providing detailed personal and employment 
information, agreeing to sign a pledge not to access information that threatens state 
security” as well as “register with the police for the intent to surf” (Abbott, 2001: 102). In 
regulations published in September 2000, the State Bureau of Secrecy Regulations 
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ordered all websites to undergo security checks and made the online transmission of 
“state secrets” a criminal offence (Abbott, 2001; Hachigian, 2001). A month later more 
regulations were issued “prohibiting content that subverts state power, disturbs social 
order, undermines reunification efforts with Taiwan, spreads rumours, preaches the 
teachings of evil cults, distributes salacious materials, dispenses pornography, slanders 
others, or harms the honour of China” (Hachigian, 2001: 123-124). Online media 
companies are not allowed to generate or re-publish news unless they have special 
licences. China‟s online media system is divided between the state-owned news websites 
and the privately owned commercial media (Wu, 2005).  In the  Provisional Regulations 
on Governance of Internet-based News Providers published in November 2000, only the 
state-owned media were granted the right of producing and distributing news whereas the 
commercial online media were stripped of any right to produce their own news and were 
only allowed to republish stories from official sources (Hachigian, 2001; Wu, 2005).  
Nevertheless, commercial websites have capitalised heavily on the authorities‟ 
looser policy on “soft” news. So when it comes to sports and entertainment, they act as 
typical news media and produce their own news stories. Even thought this clearly 
circumvents the Provisional Regulations rules, no punishments have occurred (Wu, 
2005). However, when it comes to “hard” news, which includes anything that has to do 
with sensitive political news or foreign policy news, the government “has no humour 
about its seriousness” (Wu, 2005: 233) and as a web developer said “there are some 
issues the government has no sense of humour about and we just stay away from those” 
(Hachigian, 2001: 124). Through legal influence over intermediaries, authorities have 
managed to implement an indirect control and force business such as ISPs, online content 
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media and Internet cafes to implement a good business practice as all these laws make 
them responsible for their online content; the threat of sanctions has forced them to 
implement their own technologies for Internet control (Boas, 2005).  
Regulations introduced in October 2000 require ISPs and Internet Content 
Providers (ICPs) to keep logs of their Internet traffic for 60 days and deliver the 
information to the authorities if requested (Clark and Harwit, 2001; Hachigian, 2001). 
Many Internet cafes have installed blocking software that limit what users can view as 
well. Other technologies that allow public security bureaus to track user records and 
postings on chat rooms have also been installed (Boas, 2005). Overall, “the authorities 
work to maintain an atmosphere of surveillance and implicit and explicit threats where 
those who work in the media will censor themselves rather than risk incurring unwanted 
official attention and punitive sanctions” (McCormick and Liu, 2003: 145). Indeed the 
threat of sanctions, occasional large-scale crackdowns on Internet cafés and arrests of 
online dissidents have been successful in installing a sense of fear, which has promoted a 
self-censorship norm. In fact, “the self-censorship that the regime promotes among 
individuals and domestic Internet content providers is the primary way officials control 
what Chinese viewers see” (Hachigian, 2001: 123).  
In building its control architecture, China solicited the help of Western companies 
which were happy to help since that gave them a foot in the door of the biggest consumer 
market in the world. Multinationals such as Microsoft, Yahoo and Google have helped 
the Chinese government with filtering technologies. In fact, “The sophisticated 
technology that allows the government to block and filter Internet content is primarily 
designed by foreign companies” (Sheffield, 2006). Western firms are happy to comply 
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with Chinese regulations or even help the Chinese authorities by providing technologies 
that inhibit access to information and facilitate user surveillance in order to gain access to 
Chinese markets; after all they are more committed to profits than civil liberties and calls 
by human-rights activists for freedom of information (McCormick and Liu, 2003).  
Sheffield (2006) provides a very good picture of how three of the biggest 
American online technology companies have cooperated with Chinese authorities: In 
2002, Yahoo! signed the “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the China Internet 
Industry,” which among other requires Yahoo! to “refrain from producing, posting or 
disseminating harmful information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social 
stability.” In addition, what Sheffield calls even more disturbing, Yahoo! helped in the 
arrest and imprisonment of two journalists by revealing their identities to the authorities. 
Despite its “Don‟t be evil” motto, Google has recently launched a Chinese version of its 
search engine; essentially a self-censoring version of its original website. Microsoft 
restricts users of MSN spaces from using certain terms, and in December 2005, following 
a request from Chinese authorities it shut down the blog of an active critic of censorship 
in China. The surprising fact, however, is that the blog was hosted on servers located in 
the US so essentially Microsoft was not only helping the Chinese authorities censor 
political material in China but also all over the world. Yahoo!, Google and Microsoft 
have been severely criticised by Amnesty International for complying with the Chinese 
government attempts to censor the Internet, but the economic leverage of China‟s market 
has gained foreign companies over.  
Again we are warned about China‟s ability to harness the full economic benefits 
of the Internet unless it loosens up its political control: “…victory over cyberspace cannot 
 - 37 -  
be decisive, because the Internet cannot deliver its full commercial benefits under strict 
political control” (Hachigian, 2001).  
IV. Revisiting Modernization Theory 
China‟s ability to sustain a remarkable economic development for almost three 
decades without replacing its authoritative regime with a democratically elected 
government has puzzled many analysts. China‟s case challenges the positive linear 
relationship between economic theory and democratisation as stipulated by 
modernization theory. Conventional wisdom holds that political liberalisation trails 
economic growth with only a small lag of time, and clearly the CCP has hold on to its 
political grip for much longer than expected.  
 
The Concept of Strategic Coordination 
Several scholars have tried to explain China‟s ability to defy modernization and 
one of the most recent explanations appeared in the Foreign Affairs journal in Autumn 
2005. In an essay called “Development and Democracy” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and 
George W. Downs (BDMD) put forth a very compelling argument which is based on the 
concept of strategic coordination. Strategic coordination “refers to the set of activities 
that people must engage in to win political power in a given situation” and it “helps 
explain how some autocrats have managed to break or weaken the link between 
economic development and democratization” (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005: 81). 
BDMD argue that  
“Gradually through trial and error, oppressive regimes have discovered that they 
can suppress opposition activity without totally undermining economic growth by 
carefully rationing a particular subset of public goods – goods that are critical to 
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political coordination but less important for economic cooperation” (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Downs, 2005: 81).  
 
The catch is that autocrats must control what BDMD call “coordination goods,” which 
are those public goods that allow political opponents to coordinate while providing the 
public with those public goods that foster economic development. This way authoritarian 
regimes allow the country to have economic progress but prevent any political demands 
from rising.  
 The authors present China‟s Internet restrictions as an example of this strategy. 
Intrigued by their argument I decided to explore it more. It all seemed quite convincing.  
Unlike Gorbachev who introduced freedom of expression along economic restructuring 
in the USSR in the mid 1980s, the Chinese government has not loosened up its control on 
freedom of information among other political coordination goods. The Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union collapsed and the USSR was dismembered in 1991, whereas the CCP 
still reins the political front of China. Except from the Tiananmen Square events of 1989 
when angry university students were protesting for political liberalisation, the CCP‟s 
political survival has never been threatened. Having this in mind, my initial goal in 
writing this essay was to use the BDMD argument to show how Internet Censorship has 
helped the CCP maintain its political grip.  
However, as I started to examine the argument I discovered that the “red firewall” 
could be by-passed easily. In fact, what makes China‟s censorship policy so successful is 
not its technological architecture but the self-censorship people impose on themselves. 
People don‟t actually take the risks of seeking out the information the Chinese authorities 
are trying to prevent them from seeing. My research took a different turn when I asked: 
“if Internet censorship in China was relaxed, would we witness a political uprising 
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leading to democratisation?” “Would the CCP be politically threatened, if it relaxed its 
control on the Internet and information control in general?” All these questions lead to a 
crucial one: “How crucial is lack of freedom of information on the Internet to China‟s 
political liberalisation?” 
The BDMD argument assumes that if political coordination goods were not 
controlled, people would demand political change and democratisation. The authors 
presume that the only reason people are not raising their demands for political change is 
because the Chinese authorities been successful in preventing the political coordination. 
By controlling the Internet the CCP has managed to frustrate of its ability to connect 
people and thus their possible coordination for political opposition. However, there is one 
major blind spot weaved into this argument: the presupposition of political actors‟ 
identities. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs are correct in asserting that authoritarian 
regimes “are not passive observers of political change,” nevertheless they take for 
granted the identity of the other political actor in the equation. They assume that the only 
thing preventing people from demanding their political freedom is the lack of 
coordination among them.  Yet, when we look closer to the success of Internet censorship 
we in fact discover that it is a porous system. Not a single article I have come across 
exemplifying the overarching control of the Internet by the Chinese authorities, failed to 
note that there are still ways to foul the system.  
   
A Porous System  
According to a Chinese journalist: “The government has tried to build a digital 
Great Wall to separate the Chinese people from free information, but its ability to impose 
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this form of censorship is limited. Anyone who has some knowledge of the Internet can 
find a way to access what they want” (Fromson, 1998). Hachigian uses a nice metaphor 
to illustrate the difficulty of blocking each and every site that has subversive material: 
“The Web is like a train carrying millions of passengers – scientists, porn stars, doctors, 
dissidents – sitting randomly throughout the cars. The only way to sort them is to stop the 
train, have inspectors climb aboard while everyone waits and throw the undesirables off 
one by one” (Hachigian, 2001: 128). This becomes even more overwhelming as more and 
more websites are constantly uploaded on the World Wide Web. Similarly unfeasible is 
monitoring more than twenty million email messages that are sent every day in China 
(Hachigian, 2001).  
Internet users can circumvent the barriers and access blocked websites through 
the use of proxy servers (Abbott, 2001; Hachigian, 2001; Hermida, 2002; McCormick 
and Liu, 2003; Boas 2005). Proxy servers are computers outside the country‟s own 
network whose transitions are not interdicted by the authorities‟ filters (McCormick and 
Liu, 2003). Interestingly, a Chinese newspaper ran a report in 1999 that taught users how 
to use proxy servers for “faster” connections. Moreover, much of the news carried on 
blocked websites such as The Washington Post also appear in other websites that are 
considered “innocent” and their content can always copied into an email and sent to 
China (Hachigian, 2001: 128). 
So if everyone can just bypass the great red firewall, how come Internet 
censorship has been working in China? Well as presented in the previous section, 
infrastructure is one of four mechanisms used by the Chinese authorities and even 
thought it doesn‟t exercise absolute control on Internet use, the combination with the rest 
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mechanisms make the control more effective. In fact, self-censorship is the most effective 
part of Internet control. Although Lynch dismisses crackdowns as “either empty rituals or 
devious stratagems used by reformist political coalitions to appease more conservative 
factions” (Lynch, 1999: 14), other writers such as Chase and Mulvenon (2002) provide a 
numerous examples of high-profile crackdowns and arrests. Prison sentences have 
deterred individuals acting in a similar way and most internet cafés and discussion forms 
police themselves in order to stay out of trouble.   
According to Kalathil and Boas “although some may wish to access uncensored 
news or politically sensitive websites, average users are too risk-averse to do so” 
(Kalathil and Boas, 2003: 143). But isn‟t defying risk and fear part of any ideological 
movement? Why aren‟t the Chinese people taking the risks needed for their fight for 
democracy? What‟s keeping them for taking the risks? If “the Chinese state is not an 
omnipotent entity, but has numerous permeable holes” (Yang, 2003: 437), why don‟t 
people leap on the opportunity to escape censorship, organise, coordinate and raise their 
demands for political freedom? Why haven‟t they taken advantage of the Internet‟s 
heralded role as a catalyst for democracy to bring about the popular demand for political 
power so many scholars have been waiting for? What is holding them back from not 
picking through the hole on the re firewall? But the most important question to ask, one 
that Bueno de Mesquita and Downs failed to ask, is “Who are these Internet users?” 
China’s Internet Demographics 
 Dutton tells us we need to bear in mind that Internet access is socially shaped and 
“therefore reflects fundamental structures of a given society” (Dutton, 1999 as 
summarised in Qiu, 2003: 4). In the case of China statistics show that Internet access is 
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by large limited to a relative small fraction of society which comprises the affluent and 
educated middle class the resides urban areas. 153 million Internet users is an impressive 
number, nevertheless it only represents a mere 12% of China‟s 1.3 billion population. 
The number of Internet users is so small in relation to the population size that even if a 
politically subversive message was sent to every single one of them, the effect would be 
little since the majority of the population would not even see the message.  
Furthermore, the demographic gaps in income, education and age between 
Internet users and average Chinese demonstrate that Web users are not representative of 
the general population. The education gap is staggering: 51% of Internet users have a 
college education or higher, while only 3.6% of the Chinese population has college 
education. Moreover, Web users are predominantly young with 67% being under thirty-
five and students accounting for 36% of all users (CNNIC July 2006 report). The only 
representative factor seems to be gender. While in July 1998 93% of the users were male 
(Qui, 2003), according to latest CNNIC report the male proportion has declined to 59% 
which is closer to the 51% overall male population. The majority of Internet users earn 
more that 1000 RMB per month (roughly $120), and while this is not a huge amount of 
money it is in stark contrast with the less than $2 a day the United Nations estimates 
57.8% of Chinese population lives on (Abbott, 2001: 106). Qiu (2003) also draws 
attention to the degree of uneven spatial distribution of Internet usage: 23% of users leave 
in the urban centres of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong Province even though these 
areas collectively account for only 8% of the Chinese population (Qiu, 2003: 6).  
 Clearly the statistics illustrate that Chinese Internet users tend to be young, 
wealthy and educated middle class young people and this of course has political 
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implications. Well, these young affluent users have little to complain about and may have 
little incentive to endanger their future careers by discussing politics online. In addition, 
they are most likely not to be much effected if they come across a subversive political 
message online and as social scientists have found, “those members of the Chinese 
society who see a secure career path within the existing political system may be reluctant 
to disrupt it” (Walder, 1986 and Pearson, 1997 as summarised in Harwit and Duncan, 
2001: 406). The web-based autonomous group that would challenge authority and 
possibly lead to democracy as forecasted by Taubman (1998) is not visible in China.  
Moreover, the middle class that Internet users come from is not actually very fond 
of democracy. Unger (2006) warns us that even though the rise of a middle class is 
usually seen as a forerunner of democratization, in China many members of the middle 
class don‟t want democracy: “In fact, if there is another outbreak like Tiananmen, Many 
would prefer to be on the government side of the barricades” (Unger, 2006: 29). Unlike 
the time of the Tiananmen protests in 1989, when the urban educated population was 
upset with low salaries and government corruption, today the educated and wealthy 
Chinese middle class is content in the current system and the students look forward to 
their material futures. The members of the middle class are elitist and hold China‟s 
peasant majority in disdain. They do not want the peasants to have a decisive role in the 
politics of the country and thus many middle class members do not want democracy 
(Unger, 2006: 28-29). Chen reports similar findings in her research: “Such an elitist 
complex poses a psychological obstacle in their acceptance of political equality based on 
the one-citizen-one-vote principle” (Chen, 2003: 417). Unger predicts: “Don‟t expect 
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regime change or democratization any time soon. The rise of China‟s middle class blocks 
the way” (Unger, 2006: 31).    
  
Technological Determinism 
 Emerging out of modernization theory, the argument of Internet-led 
democratisation shares its determinism. Lynch uses the term “technological determinism” 
to describe the wide-spread belief that “wherever advanced communications equipment 
becomes available, democratization will certainly occur” (Lynch, 1999: 228). Once again 
the role of capitalistic development and in this case technological advancement is 
overvalued at the expense of human action. The argument that Internet will facilitate the 
overthrow of authoritarian regimes and replace it with democratically elected 
governments assumes that the Internet users are willing to do so. It also assumes that 
technology will have the same impact in different regions and cultures, although “the 
same technology has different social implications under different historical and social 
conditions” (Yang, 2003: 455). McCormick and Liu bring attention to the fact that in 
Europe printing was seen as “an agent of the Enlightenment” which spread knowledge 
while in China the introduction of printing helped in the distribution of knowledge but a 
similar “enlightenment” did not take place (McCormick and Liu, 2003: 143). 
 The belief that if technology is introduced everything else will fall into place is 
plagued with social blindness (Putnam, 2001). Critics of technological determinism site 
the importance of a civil society in the rise of democracy as “a vigorous civil society is 
often taken to be foundational to democratic politics” (Yang, 2003: 455). Even though 
telecommunications and mass media play an important role in democratic transitions, 
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“information needs social context in order to be meaningful” (Putman, 2000: 172). So in 
other words, unless technological advances are coupled with a vibrant civil society  
  The rise of civil society is closely related to capitalist development and it is today 
heavily viewed as a foundation of democracy. Rooted in the Scottish Enlightenment civil 
society is “that collection of diverse interest groups and social organizations that is strong 
enough to provide some autonomy and protection to individuals from the authoritarian 
and hegemonic tendencies of states” and has helped to “motivate and inspire democratic 
struggles under authoritarian regimes” (Candland, 2001: 140). Hegel and Max used the 
term to “denote the particular form of society which emerged with the growth of 
capitalism, rooted in the autonomous sphere of economic activity” (White, 1993: 66). 
Gramsci put the notion of civil society in the centre of revolutionary change and argued 
that for fundamental political transformation to take place, civil society had to reject state 
authority (Perry, 1994).  
 So in other words, a dynamic civil society needs to be present for technological 
advances to play a role in the emergence of a democratic political system. Does such a 
civil society exist in China?  
 
 
A Chinese Civil Society? 
The student protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989, brought in a wave of interest 
in studying civil society in China. The rise of democracy in Latin America and Southern 
Europe as well as the dismantling of communism in Easter Europe were attributed to the 
existence of a vibrant civil society and scholars wondered if the Tiananmen events 
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signalled the rise of a civil society in China that was ready to defend the citizens against 
an authoritarian regime. There has been a strong debate, however, on whether a concept 
with such deep Western origins can be applied to China. Huang (1993) and Wakeman 
(1993) argue that the concept is hard to apply to Chinese realities because it is value-
laden and historically specific. Similarly Dean (1997) refuses to apply such a Western-
based concept to China as he sees it completely irrelevant to the Chinese culture.  
On the other hand, other scholars understood the events of 1989 as “a 
fundamental conflict between a state with totalitarian intentions and an emerging civil 
society” (McCormick, Shaozhi and Xiaoming: 1992: 182). Lynch, however argues that 
the problem of the semi-autonomous Chinese groups do not fulfil the classic criteria of 
civil society, and “specifically the requirements that (1) such groups enjoy a sphere of 
legal autonomy acknowledged and guaranteed by the state; (2) the groups in turn 
acknowledge the state‟s legitimacy as the primary rule-maker and rule-enforce in society 
(3) the groups energetically pursue the political of their members, albeit within 
frameworks constructed in negotiations with the state; and (4) the groups partake of the 
political dialogue that should be flourishing in a liberal, well-structured public sphere” 
(Lynch, 1999: 231).  
Indeed some scholars have been so determined to find civil society in China that 
they either ignore the definition or stretch the meaning of the term to encompass the 
realities of the Chinese society and thus create a “civil society with Chinese 
characteristics” (Chamberlain, 1997; Lynch, 1999). White argues that “with the socio-
economic changes wrought by the economic reforms, a social space has begun to open up 
between the state and economic agents, and a parallel shift has occurred in the balance of 
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power between the state the new non-state actors” even as he acknowledges that “at the 
present stage, the independence and the influence of the associations are too weak to 
allow us to call them „pressure‟ groups or even „interest‟ groups... as organisations they 
are far too deeply penetrated by the state” (White, 1993: 67).  
McCormick, Shaozhi and Xiaoming argue that the most apparent form of civil 
society during the first decade of reforms was the development of the private 
entrepreneurial organisation. If we accept Moore‟s “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” then 
this would be a positive sign for the democratisation prospects of China. However, 
although Chinese entrepreneurs have gained substantial autonomy from state authority 
they show no potential of acting as a catalyst for political change. Pearson (1997) 
explains that instead of forging horizontal relations among themselves entrepreneurs seek 
to build relationships that lead to “socialist corporatist” and “clientelist” state-society 
relations. Even organisations that “at times enjoy de facto autonomy are „hooked‟ into a 
formal state structure” (McCormick, Shaozhi and Xiaoming, 1992: 196). Pearson asserts 
that “the new business elite does not represent an emerging civil society” as the new 
business elite has failed to convert its “economic position to political influence” (Pearson, 
1997; 101, 9). Similarly, Solinger argues that economic development in China has 
softened rather than sharpened the state-society relationship. She concludes that “it is 
hard to claim there are any immediate grounds for hope of change… the cords that 
connect merchant to bureaucrat and both to the state continue to tighten” (Solinger, 1993: 
144). A recent development that tightens these cords even more has been the decision of 
the CCP to allow for the first time private entrepreneurs to join the party thus weaving 
together the public and private sphere even further.  
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This analysis shows that the western-style civil society that has toppled 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Europe does not exist 
in China. Chinese media organisations “are simply in no position to play the political role 
of some of the prestigious Latin American newspapers that clung tenaciously to a semi-
autonomous status during years of harsh oppression” (Lynch, 1999: 234). Furthermore, 
the social organisations that some scholars point to as evidence of an emerging Chinese 
civil society, do not have the power to act as pressure groups or even interest groups. 
Lynch argues that even though the Chinese state has lost a significant degree of control 
over thought work, it has not been replaced by a “liberal public sphere,” a term that 
denotes “order, predictability and vigorous political debate” (Lynch, 1999: 5). Instead the 
signs of apolitical Chinese society have been manifested in the commercialisation of 
media.  
Commercialisation means that the mass media offers products that appeal to the 
audience‟s tastes and in the case of China people do not demand “the political news 
required to feed a civil society, but rather meretricious entertainment” (Lynch, 1999: 
235). McCormick and Liu warn us that “A public sphere based on consuming 
entertainment commodities is a poor foundation for political debate” (McCormick and 
Liu, 2003: 140). Similarly Hewitt and Clark (2001) found that Internet users were more 
interested in subjects such as sports, living, travel and food than news. Even though they 
recognised that online avenues for “greater political dialogue are expanding,” they 
concluded that currently “there is little indication that Internet forums are contributing to 
a greater degree of Chinese civil society. The kind of future challenge seen by Taubman 
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and others who forecast net-based autonomous group formation, and perhaps eventually 
democracy, has yet to materialise” (Hewitt and Clark, 2001: 406).  
 
V. Conclusion 
 The goal of this thesis was to examine an argument recently presented by Bueno 
de Mesquita and Downs in an effort to explain why China‟s economic development has 
yet to lead to democratisation. I chose to concentrate on China‟s ability to control the 
Internet, because the Internet‟s characteristic as both a political coordination good and an 
economic good presented a fascinating case study. 
 In investigating this question I was first inclined to answer in the affirmative:  
China has been successful in effectively controlling the Internet‟s political threat and thus 
avoiding any political demands that could arise through it. However, as I looked closer at 
Internet censorship I realised that the Chinese virtual firewall is not as restrictive as I 
originally thought. In fact, I discovered that China‟s technological system that controls 
the Internet censorship is quite porous and any Internet user with some computer 
knowledge can peek over the firewall. Nevertheless, occasional arrests and punishments 
of online dissidents avert Internet users from circumventing Internet censorship. Their 
adversity to risk left me puzzled as I wondered: aren‟t oppressed people supposed to defy 
the risks in their fight for political freedom?  
 At that point I started unpacking the BDMD argument and uncovered its big blind 
spot: it assumes that Chinese Internet users are oppressed and given the opportunity they 
will take advantage of the technology to raise their political demands. The BDMD 
argument assumes that if political goods were not controlled people would actually 
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demand political change and democratization. They presuppose that the only reason 
people are not raising their demands for political change is because the Chinese 
authorities are doing a great job controlling the networks that connect people. 
Nevertheless by removing the BDMD blind spot on assuming political actor identities, I 
realised that Chinese Internet users have no interest in democratisation.  
 By examining the demographics of Internet users in China, I discovered that they 
are wealthy, educated, young people whose middle class status does not provide them 
with any motivation to revolt against the Chinese authorities. Not only they are not 
willing to risk their status by breaking censorship rules but these Internet users are not 
willing to share the voting power with the peasants. In fact, they are not even supporters 
of democracy. In their argument, BDMD assume the identity of oppressed people that 
given the chance they will fight for their political freedom. However, this is not the 
identity of Chinese Internet users and thus we should not be surprised they have not led 
the way of an Internet driven democratisation.   
The BDMD argument is also plagued with the deterministic character of 
modernization theory, which exemplifies the role of structures on the expense of human 
action. In this case, the Internet was seen as a vehicle for political transformation. 
Nonetheless technology needs a social context to be meaningful and different societies 
give different meanings to the same technological tools. So even though China‟s system 
of Internet control is porous, the civil political action expected by analysts has not taken 
place since a Western-style civil society does not exist in China. Even though some 
scholars have extended the term of civil society in order to encompass Chinese reality, 
the social organisations they have found in China are too weak to serve as pressure 
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groups against the authoritarian regime. So once again, an assumption deeply routed into 
the BDMD argument does not exist in the Chinese reality and analysts‟ predictions of 
online forums developing into web-based autonomous groups and pushing for 
democratisation have not taken place. 
By examining why Internet has failed to act as a catalyst for democracy, I have 
illustrated that on the surface we can indeed agree with the BDMD argument. CCP‟s 
policies have managed to rip the economic benefits of Internet commercialization while 
at the same time curtailing any political coordination and thus successfully managing to 
maintain its authoritarian power. However, that argument serves us with a simplistic 
explanation and by looking closer we can see that that the assumptions that underline it 
do not exist in China. The BDMD analysis follows suit with modernization theory, which 
sees economic growth as a one-way street leading to democratization. There are no other 
detours to follow. Analyst after analyst has tooted the horn of modernization theory 
arguing that democratization follows economic development with just a minor time lag. 
So does economic development lead to political liberalisation? In the case of 
China it hasn‟t and at this point it would be unwise to make future predictions. Despite a 
certain tendency in international politics literature to make predictions, and especially 
positivism‟s constant attempt to construct iron-clad laws in order to make future 
projections we should try to understand rather than explain and predict. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the analyses which to explain China‟s ability to reform and liberalise 
its economy without sacrificing political control by pointing to its ability to control and 
suppress political coordination goods suffer from their deterministic rationalization and 
tendency to explain rather than understand. Embedded in a structural explanation of 
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political change, they assume the identity and thus the behaviour of people, which is 
reduced to material conditions. Even though they claim to explain the weakened link 
between economic and political liberalisation, they bring with them the fundamental 
assumptions of modernization, which amplifies the role of economic development at the 
expense of human action. In fact, their explanation only serves to strengthen the 
modernization theory as it only tries to give excuses to the delayed development of a 
democratic political system as stipulated by the deterministic character of modernization. 
As a result, instead of seeking to understand the underlying forces in play they only 
explain why X has not yet led to Y without contemplating the possibility of X leading Z 
and not Y. The aim of this thesis has not been to offer an alternative theory nor make 
future predictions. Rather the goal was to expose the blind spots of these analyses, 
exemplify their rigidity and suggest that it is time to break away from conventional 
wisdom and start looking at other possibilities.   
 Maybe China will become democratic at some point in the future, but even if it 
does it might follow a different route than deterministic theories predict. After all China‟s 
capitalistic development is a “rare phenomenon in terms of its origins, path and depth” 
and “China is presumably the first country in world history where capitalism is largely an 
„artifact‟ invented by the state” (Chen, 2002: 405). So we might see a new form of 
political system in China, one that we have not yet experienced in other parts of the 
world.  Even Fukuyama (1992) who in his seminal work “The End of History and the 
Last Man” saw liberal democracy and capitalism as the essential organization in modern 
societies, in his later work “Trust” cautioned us that “It is not sufficient to say that 
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everyone eventually arrives at the same goal but by different paths…some never arrive at 
all” (Fukuyama, 1995: 342).  
Interestingly enough, one of Lipset‟s closing and grossly over-looked remarks in 
his essay that gave rise to modernization theory was: “Unfortunately…this conclusion 
does not justify the optimistic liberal‟s hope that an increase in wealth, in the size of 
middle class, in education and other related factors will necessarily mean the spread of 
democracy” (Lipset, 1959: 103).  
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